

Balances, authorizations, etc., available for U.S. foreign aid programs under H.R. 13175, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (Sept. 28, 1962)

	Unexpended balances, June 30, 1962 (estimated)	Appropriations in H.R. 13175 as reported in the Senate	Total avail- ability
Title I: Foreign aid (mutual security):			
Military assistance:	\$2,791,500,000	\$1,050,000,000	\$4,241,500,000
Economic assistance:			
Development grants:	438,500,000	275,000,000	713,500,000
Development loans:	2,193,000,000	1,125,000,000	3,288,000,000
Alliance for Progress:	315,000,000	355,000,000	1,030,000,000
Supporting assistance:	457,000,000	400,000,000	857,000,000
Contingency fund:	257,000,000	250,000,000	547,000,000
International organizations:	70,000,000	148,000,000	218,000,000
Surveys of investment opportunities:	1,000,000	1,000,000	2,000,000
Investment guarantees:	236,500,000	100,000,000	336,500,000
American hospitals abroad (Poland):		2,800,000	2,800,000
Administrative expenses:			
Agency for International Development:	9,000,000	22,000,000	61,000,000
Department of State:	3,350,000	3,100,000	6,450,000
Subtotal, title I:	6,948,890,000	4,422,800,000	11,371,690,000
Title II: Foreign aid (other):			
Peace Corps:	19,238,000	63,735,000	82,983,000
Ryukyus Island administration:	3,550,000	12,000,000	15,550,000
Cuban refugees:	3,011,000	70,119,000	73,130,000
Migration and refugee assistance:	5,500,000	10,577,000	16,077,000
Inter-American Development Bank:	290,000,000	90,000,000	380,000,000
International Development Association:	50,000,000	61,650,000	111,650,000
Subtotal, title II:	289,353,000	284,150,000	573,503,000
Title III: Loans to International Monetary Fund:		2,000,000,000	2,000,000,000
Title IV: Export-Import Bank of Washington:		4,373,817,000	4,373,817,000
Title V: Miscellaneous agencies:			
Philippine war damages, claims, and expenses:		73,500,000	73,500,000
International conferences and contingencies:		849,000	849,000
Subtotal, title V:		74,349,000	74,349,000
Other identifiable balances (exclusive of Public Law 86):			
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development:	5,715,000,000		5,715,000,000
Total:	17,327,999,000	6,781,822,000	24,109,821,000

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, how is the time being controlled?

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is divided, and the Senator from New York is in charge of the time available on his side.

Mr. JAVITS. Very well.

Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I desire to make a few remarks about the situation in Cuba.

First, I wish to refer to an editorial published today in the New York Times. The editorial refers to me and also to my junior colleague (Mr. KEATING), and implies that I—at this time I shall not speak for my colleague (Mr. KEATING), who is perfectly able to speak for himself—am among those who are urging President Kennedy to take unilateral action against Cuba which could easily lead to war.

Mr. President, I have been approached before on this theory by many well-meaning persons who have the interests of our country as much at heart as I do, but who apparently do not understand either precisely what I advocate or precisely what is at stake.

In commenting on what I advocate, let me say that apparently the editorial writer did not read the speech I made yesterday, although I am glad to say that it received excellent coverage in the New York Times. In that speech I pointed out that what we expect of the President is not a commitment in re-

gard to action of a unilateral character, but a sense of urgency. I pointed out that I am so thoroughly devoted to the bipartisan foreign policy of the United States that I would not seek in any sense to embarrass the President in the conduct of our foreign policy, once that decision had been made, and that the reason why I feel free to speak about Cuba is that the decision has not been made, but the President is engaged in what he calls close surveillance, through our forces, before determining what our policy is to be.

First, as to my own concept of our policy: I believe our ultimate objective must be to restore to the people of Cuba their rightful privilege of self-government and self-determination, which we are confident would mean the end of Castro, because communism, I believe, we are all convinced, does not represent the will of the people of Cuba or what they bargained for when Castro came to power. Castro came to power under no such announcement, but as a revolutionary who was seeking to end the tyranny which the people of Cuba had suffered at the hands of Batista and others.

How is that objective to be obtained? I have advocated, and advocate now, that a sense of urgency dictates making the Organization of American States face its responsibility and face the issue, not by pleasant conversations but by deliberative meetings. The Inter-American Treaty of 1947 makes clear their respon-

If the effort is unsuccessful through that means—and all signs indicate it will be, though it must be done since this course of action is a condition precedent to any further course of action—then we next must seek the creation of a new inter-American defense organization in the Caribbean and Central America. There is every promise that it would be successful. Then that defense organization would take the action required in order to prevent the Communists from continuing to build up a military base in Cuba.

Third, in the same deliberate way, have the NATO powers faced this issue, not in informal conversations, but at a council meeting, so that they, too, can face their responsibility.

Having done those things, the United States can then decide what will be its next course, again remembering our objective, which is to restore to the Cuban people self-determination and self-government and to prevent the Communist arms buildup there.

Let us remember one thing—and we must never forget it—we are not facing Castro; we are facing Khrushchev. If we understand that, then we will have a Cuban policy which makes sense. We are facing Khrushchev. This is his offensive in the cold war in the Western Hemisphere.

One is asked the question, What is the authority of the other American states? Why cannot Cuba deal with the Soviet Union if it chooses to? Is it not a sovereign state?

The answer to that question is found in unmistakable terms in an article of the Inter-American Treaty of 1947. This issue is completely taken care of by the language of article 6, which was almost prescient:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state should be affected—

Meaning "should be threatened"—

by an aggression which is not an armed attack, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America—

Let me repeat those words:

or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the course of action which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression, or in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

It seems to me that even those who are opposed to taking action against Castro's Cuba—or Khrushchev's Cuba, which it really is—would agree that the "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" is being built up on Cuban soil right now, and it must not stand. It is like the situation in Mississippi—it is not being built up by the United States; it is being built up by others; in the case of Cuba by other nations; that issue must be pinned down and faced by the American nations, not in informal conversations, but in the

most deliberate and grimmest meetings of the OAS.

Once a great nation acts to commit itself unilaterally, it cannot stop until its objective is achieved. That is why all of us are united behind the United States as the President in respect of the disastrous failure at the Bay of Pigs. I still take my share of the responsibility, as one who is devoted to our responsibilities in foreign policy, for that failure. That does not mean we should not learn from it and do better next time.

We are not committing ourselves to take unilateral action. We are not committing our forces. A great power cannot do that unless it means business all the way. But it means that after we have tried every other avenue which I have suggested and still find we cannot proceed, in the name of the inter-American system, under the treaty of 1947, or under a security treaty in Central America or the Caribbean, the United States reserves to itself the decision as to how it will deal with the situation if its vital national interests are violated.

If we explore further political means and we are still stymied and frustrated, we will take another look; and we are not committed as to what we will do in that eventuality.

Mr. President, I said as much yesterday, and I ask unanimous consent that a news account of the statement I made yesterday be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, we are asked one other question: Why should not the Russians have a base in the Western Hemisphere when we have a base in Turkey, which is on the border of the Soviet Union? The difference is that Turkey has a government which represents its people. Nobody denies that fact. It is a NATO partner. It is involved with us in that Organization.

Second, and critically important, it is not we who threaten aggression against the world. It is not we who say we will send our rockets and missiles against the United States if somebody harms a hair of Cuba's head, or otherwise displeases the Soviet Union. It is Khrushchev who is constantly rattling missiles.

Incorporated in the United Nations Charter as well, are procedures to defend our treaty commitments in the free world against a voiced and determined threat, which we do not make, and which we have never made. So I see no similarity between the situation of Turkey and Cuba.

Finally, there are those who say that if the Western World acts in Cuba, the Russians may act with respect to Berlin, Turkey, or somewhere else. Of course they may. They may do it on any afternoon, or on any one of a hundred occasions, including the episode of the U-2 plane which flew over Russia. Such a possibility cannot be determinative of our policy.

There is grave risk in any policy we undertake, but when we undertake it,

we must stick to that policy notwithstanding the risk, because the policy is so persuasive.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. I yield myself 2 more minutes.

To sum up, Mr. President, I say let us do everything that must be done in consulting our allies in the OAS and in NATO, in the greatest deliberativeness, and not in any informal conversations or private negotiating. Let us organize a new defense organization in the Caribbean and Central America, where the trouble now is. Let us then take another look at what should be the next course of action. Let us not tie our hands and say we can move only if certain things happen.

That is the sound policy which we must adopt, and which must be adopted in view of the posture which Khrushchev has adopted in the Western Hemisphere. Incidentally, whatever may be the ideas with respect to the Monroe Doctrine, whether it is out of date or whether it is a warning which is 130 years old—it is at least that, and Khrushchev has decided to fly in the face of it.

Let us all understand that. Mr. Khrushchev has done this with his eyes wide open, after the United States had served notice for a century and a third. I think that should carry great weight in demonstrating good faith of the United States, and the seriousness of our purpose.

[From The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1962]
JAVITS ASKS KENNEDY TO DISCUSS CUBAN THREAT

Senator JACOB K. JAVITS declared yesterday that President Kennedy should address the country on the gravity of the Cuban situation and also ask for an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States.

The New York Republican asked the President to go on television and radio to discuss Cuba and "to be blunt not only with us but with his administration."

Senator JAVITS, who is campaigning for reelection this fall, spoke at a luncheon meeting of the U.S. Inter-American Council at the Pierre Hotel.

He said that "The United States simply cannot permit the kind of military buildup which is going on in Cuba today to continue indefinitely. To do so would be to endanger directly the security of this Nation."

However, Senator JAVITS opposed an invasion or a blockade of Cuba, saying he could not go for such a simple solution.

"This is 1962, not 1898," he reminded his audience. "Unlike the Americans of Theodore Roosevelt's day we cannot have a quick little war in Cuba and have done with it."

In urging the President to ask for an emergency meeting of the OAS, Senator JAVITS acknowledged that the OAS had refused in the past to act against Cuba. "My answer to that is that we must find out if the OAS will refuse to act," he said. "It is a vital condition precedent to anything we will do."

If the OAS refuses to heed the President, Senator JAVITS went on, "the United States would move immediately to seek to organize a Central American and Caribbean defense organization, pledged and armed to see to it that Castrolism and Soviet arms are contained within Cuba and that Castro's power is gradually undermined."

Senator JAVITS criticized the Kennedy administration for what he said was downgrading of worry over Soviet arms going to Cuba.

He charged that the White House has not crystallized U.S. policy on Cuba, but added that "the public senses that it is way ahead of the White House in its estimate of the seriousness of the situation."

EXHIBIT 1

A POLICY ON CUBA

(By Senator JAVITS, of New York)

The mail flooding into my office makes one fact very plain: The American people are disturbed about the Cuban situation, deeply disturbed, disturbed as they have not been since the Korean war.

This concern is no emotional binge, as some commentators have tried to make it out. The worry is the perfectly legitimate one of any sensible citizen. Potential Russian missile and submarine bases in Cuba are nothing to be taken lightly. The Soviet arms moving into Havana make it increasingly difficult for the Cuban people to overthrow Castro. Most dangerous of all is the fact that as we know very well, the Soviet motive will be to export communism throughout Latin America; indeed, the heritage of unstable government and social injustice is such that the present economic and social condition of many countries to the south offers a field day to such ambitions.

It is not farfetched to picture a future in which the United States could be in a giant pincer, with a Latin America largely Red forming one hinge and a Red Russia and China forming the other.

We must recognize as a people that we are dealing with Khrushchev, not Castro, in Cuba. We are directly confronting Soviet power militarily, economically and propagandawise in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. This historic breakthrough presents us with a completely different situation from Berlin or from the danger of Soviet reaction on Turkey if we move in Cuba, because it is a threat to our base of operations.

The prime danger of the Soviet in Cuba is not so much the simple one of grave imminent danger to the physical integrity of the United States but rather of undermining the Western Hemisphere base of the free peoples by enticing away others of the American Republics to follow the example of Cuba. I believe this was implicit in the joint resolution on Cuba in the Senate and House of Representatives on September 20 and 26.

Public concern over the Cuban issue must be the deeper because while the White House has not finally crystallized the U.S. policy, the public senses that it is way ahead of the White House in its estimate of the seriousness of the situation.

The public feeling is one of urgency, of emergency, of desiring a stepped-up timetable of action.

This does not mean that the President should immediately be pushed or rushed in seeking his great constitutional responsibility for the Nation's foreign policy, but it does mean that officials like myself must express their views so that the national consensus, which will influence the President's policy, may be truly representative of the Nation.

At his most recent formal discussion of the subject, the President downgraded worries over Soviet arms moving into Cuba. They "do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere."

Despite the Soviet armament Castro now has at his disposal to crush any revolt, the President declared: "It is Mr. Castro and

his supporters who are in trouble." He lectured Americans who were excited about the day—they must, he said, keep "their head"—including, presumably, those whose heads tell them that something is decidedly amiss in the files of Florida.

President Kennedy characterized his policy toward massive Soviet arms shipments to Cuba as one of "careful surveillance." But he left unanswered the basic question: Is our timetable reflecting the real urgency of the situation?

In all fairness, the President did speak as if he had understood that there might be something besides "surveillance."

"Let me make this clear," he said. "If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way . . . or if Cuba could ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force . . . or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

Now, this does have the ring of drawing a line and saying: Beyond this, not one step further.

But this leaves the drawing of the line exclusively to the President. And in view of our past mistakes, we cannot leave it at that; we must have a national consensus on urgency and timing to have a direct effect on our policy.

In the true spirit of the bipartisan foreign policy, we all took the blame for the ramshackle intervention at the Bay of Pigs, one of the most humiliating and costly blunders in modern American history. But we must be unworthy of the notoriety and responsibility we exercise if we did not learn from it.

The whole situation is one demanding blunt talk. I need not say to an audience of this kind that I am a strong backer of bipartisan foreign policy. I have been talking, and for years I have been acting bipartisanship in this field. I need also not say to you that until the national decision is taken, bipartisanship should not and cannot mean a failure to speak out on the urgency of the matter, backing the President where he seems right, criticizing him where he appears wrong, and prodding him where he seems to need it.

Just what is the nub of the Cuban situation as I see it? It is this: The United States simply cannot permit the kind of military buildup which is going on in Cuba today to continue indefinitely. To do so would be to endanger directly the security of this Nation.

What should we do about the situation? Some Americans, out of understandable anger and fear, want the United States immediately to blockade Cuba. Others want to go still further—to use the Armed Forces of the United States to drive Castro out of power. I say such attitudes are understandable; the danger is great and provocations are extreme. But at this stage a blockade or intervention is a commitment from which a great nation like our own cannot withdraw—it is irrevocable until its objective is realized. And going further, as we all know, would escalate into direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

We cannot rule out this risk, but we still have some time to try to concert a defense effort of all or some appropriate part of the Americas before we resort to the final, powerful, dangerous measure. And, too, we have not yet even recognized Cuban Government-in-exile on the model of De Gaulle's Free French with which to deal.

This is 1962, not 1898. Unlike the Americans of Theodore Roosevelt's day, we cannot have a quick little war in Cuba and have done with it. The Cuban situation is a per-

ticular instance, demanding immediate attention, but it is nonetheless only one aspect in the worldwide, longrunning cold war. One element in this cold war is obvious: it represents the entirely legitimate aspirations of the hundreds of millions around the globe for a better standard of living, the ending of color lines, stable government, peace, and a greater sense of dignity for the individual.

The eyes of these millions are on us as we make our moves in the Cuban situation. We know that Castro is now a little puppet of Khrushchev, who has cruelly abused and betrayed the hopes of the Cuban people. But this knowledge has not caught up with too many of the millions—again especially in Latin America—whom Castro is still a symbol of the bold revolutionist who thumbs his nose at rich and mighty nations like the United States and takes drastic measures at home to improve the lot of the ordinary fellow. Precisely all this makes the Bay of Pigs strengthened Castro at home and made him an appealing figure throughout Latin America.

So, in dealing with Cuba, we have strong reasons for choosing the right time. But what do we meanwhile? Eloquent talk and little action is simply not enough. For the cold fact remains: The United States cannot permit the kind of military buildup which is going on in Cuba to continue indefinitely.

I believe there are a number of moves, headheaded and vigorous moves, which can and should be taken, not tomorrow, but at once.

I call upon President Kennedy to describe the seriousness of the Cuban crisis to the American people directly on national television and radio. I call upon him to be blunt not only with us but with his administration. I call upon him to recognize the urgency plainly required by the situation.

Then must come the action—again not in some vague future but now, in the ever more dangerous present. The proper organization to handle Khrushchev in Cuba is the OAS, the Organization of American States. Through the OAS, we and all the other countries of the Western Hemisphere are pledged to protect every nation of the Hemisphere from attack to the security of just this kind. I know the Latin American foreign ministers are coming to Washington tomorrow, but Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the big three, will be absent. I call upon President Kennedy to ask for an emergency meeting of the OAS, put the matter formally and properly before the nations, and demand action. There are those who argue that the OAS has in the past refused to act against Cuba, that it will refuse again, and that we will be caught in a diplomatic failure. My answer to that is: Let me find out what the OAS will do; act; it is a vital condition precedent to anything we will do.

Also, after all, circumstances change the minds of nations as well as individuals. Surely every day makes plainer to the whole Western Hemisphere, Latin Americans as well as Americans, that the U.S.S.R. is in Cuba. If the OAS won't move, it won't move; that would be too bad. But the fear of failure leaves me cold in such a serious situation.

In the event that the OAS will not act, another swift step is called for. Cuba's closest neighbors have a question of attitude toward the rest of the continent. They ought certainly to be ready to do something

about the Cuban threat. If the OAS is stymied, the United States should move immediately to seek to organize a Central American and Caribbean defense organization, pledged and armed to see to it that Castrolism and Soviet arms are contained within Cuba and that Castro's power is gradually undermined.

At the same time, there is NATO, the alliance of the free countries of the West, which was formed precisely to serve as a bastion against the spread of communism. The Cuban situation includes this supreme irony: During the last year the merchant ships of America's NATO allies have been carried to Cuba of oil and other materiel essential to the Communist military buildup there. At present ships from NATO countries are even being chartered to transport Soviet arms and personnel. This disgraceful situation certainly can be ended. Just the other day, one NATO country, Turkey, announced that its ships would carry no more cargoes to Cuba. Like all Americans, I hailed this statement. But I would be a good deal more in a halting mood if it had been accompanied by announcements from other NATO countries.

Just a short while ago, on September 16, the New York Times reported: "The United States has had little success thus far in stopping NATO shipping for Cuba. Moreover, U.S. officials do not expect much success and they are not especially worried at present. A high-ranking Government official expressed the administration feeling that the Cuba problem is less threatening this year than it was last year."

Less threatening this year—this is the kind of attitude on which we really want to base our handling of NATO or Cuba?

Let us have done with rationalizations. Let us face the facts, however jolting they may be. And let us move. Then we will not only be keeping our hands, but President Kennedy will be using them—and, let me add, we will be calling upon that tradition of decisiveness which has heretofore marked American when plainly confronted by an enemy.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. KEATING. I wish to associate myself completely with the remarks made by my distinguished colleague. A determined effort is being made to make it appear that anyone who favors a stronger and more vigorous policy with regard to Cuba than has been pursued to date is to be identified with an immediate U.S. invasion of Cuba or some other warlike action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time yielded by the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield my colleague 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from New York is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Of course that is not true. There are many who have different views as to the method for dealing with this situation. Some would immediately go further than others. There are a great number of measures that can be taken, of varying degrees of effectiveness. Some have been discussed. Others, perhaps wisely and deliberately, have not been specifically mentioned, but are certainly in many minds.

The outline which my distinguished colleague has made is precisely, with

one addition, the proposal which I made several weeks ago when this question first arose.

The first of my proposals made August 31, again September 4 and September 6, was to tell the people the facts about Cuba. I have urged careful consideration of the possibilities of blockade—a policy vigorously supported by the Navy 2 years ago. I have urged an economic boycott of Cuba by the United States, the OAS, and NATO. Above all, I have urged Government officials to stop talking about offensive and defensive weapons and apprise the American people of the real perils we face. If this problem is becoming a political issue in the campaign being waged—and I wish to say, incidentally, that in my judgment a political campaign is nothing more than a national discussion of vital national issues and is a part of the lifeblood of a free government—it is because the American people have not yet been told the full story about Cuba. An effort has been made to downgrade the crisis and keep from the American people the full meaning of the crisis. Naturally this is resented, not only by Members of Congress, or Members running for Congress, but by the entire Nation.

As my colleague indicated, it is absurd to say that if we act in regard to Cuba the Russians will apply pressure in Berlin. Exactly the opposite is true. If we do not take a strong stand in respect to Cuba, 90 miles from our shores, the Soviets certainly will expect us not to take a strong stand in Berlin, so much farther away. Inaction in this case can be much more dangerous, more provocative, than firm action.

What we need, first and foremost, are the facts about Cuba. Some have been given. There have been two statements of fact about the Soviet buildup in Cuba—one by the President, and a briefing by the Department of State. There are many other facts which, in my judgment, should be told to the American people, and which, if they were revealed, would in no way impair the national security of the United States. On the contrary, a full statement of the facts might well result in better cooperation from our allies and the nations threatened. I think the people should be told.

There is one aspect of the Cuban situation which is a real danger, a danger not fully acknowledged as yet. I refer to the increasing number of Africans in Cuba. The most recent reports suggest that between 1,500 and 2,000 Ghanaians and Guineans are in Cuba. Women as well as men from those countries have been seen in Havana. Why are these Africans there? There are many French-speaking Africans.

Various parts of Cuba are about 100 miles by water from Haiti, from Jamaica, and very little farther from the Dominican Republic. Authoritative sources believe that these Africans are part of a deliberate plan to infiltrate the neighboring Caribbean countries and to overturn, by sabotage and subversion, the existing governments.

In Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, which is now pro-

gressing quite satisfactorily under its new post-Trujillo government, there are rumors everywhere that Cubans and Africans have been parachuted into the interior.

Let me make very clear that those rumors have not been confirmed, but it is common talk on the streets of Santo Domingo, and the rumors are a very good indication of the unrest which exists in the countries near to Cuba, the fear of the eventuality, and perhaps the shape of things to come in the Caribbean.

It was well known in Havana that at the time of the summer uprising in Venezuela, when the so-called Communist guerrillas tried to oust President Betancourt, that transport planes were ready and on the alert at Havana Airport to render assistance to the Venezuelan Communists at the first opportunity. Had the Venezuelan Government forces lost their control of their airport, we might have seen the first evidence of Castro's efforts to export aggression at that time.

Meanwhile, the equipment continues to flow from Russia into Cuba—crates that so large that special unloading machines is required, cargoes so heavy that they are unloaded only by Russians or Czechoslovaks under cover of darkness, containers so long that two railroad cars must be hooked together to carry them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New York has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield my colleague 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from New York may proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, the evidence mounts that the Cuban people are suffering under ordeals of terror and hardships. Hundreds of executions are reportedly taking place. Even the once-trusted Cuban militia is—much of it—no longer armed; weapons have been taken from the Cubans, to be stored in armories, yet the Russians and Czechoslovaks carry their weapons prominently.

As my colleague said, this is not a Castro problem, it is a Khrushchev problem.

Disease and epidemics are spreading. Thousands of children have polio. Gastroenteritis, diarrhea, and pneumonia are raging. But there is no medicine, and the Government confiscates most of the medicines mailed in by compassionate relatives. Famine threatens many, especially the poor. Cubans by the dozen are retreating to the hills, to set up guerrilla units.

We can encourage these units. We can help feed and equip them. But let us face facts. Small guerrilla groups will need more support if they are to defeat tanks, planes, missiles, and all the panoply of Soviet might. Without our assistance, these groups have no chance of victory. Without our assistance, all the countries of the Caribbean are in danger, not merely of propaganda but of direct infiltration and efforts to overthrow the government.

Unless the realities of the situation are known and understood throughout the Nation, the hemisphere, and the world, there is little hope to combat the new power of the Communist menace in the Caribbean.

To think of defeating Castro at this date, or of cleaning up this hemisphere so far as Cuba is concerned, without incurring some risk that a U.S. shot may be fired is unrealistic. That is a hazard which will always be present, not only under present circumstances, but also circumstances of the foreseeable future.

Mr. President, exactly as the danger is immeasurably greater today than it was 6 months ago, 6 months from now it will be immeasurably greater than it is today unless forceful action is taken.

I subscribe completely to what has been said with respect to action by the Organization of American States, presenting united hemispheric solidarity, which is highly desirable. We must endeavor in every way to obtain their support. We must endeavor in every way to make our NATO allies see the folly of the position they are taking. But to say that under all circumstances we will permit our hands to be tied by them and under no circumstances will we move on our own to protect the prestige, the power, and the might of the United States is contrary, I believe, to the wishes of the Congress and to the wishes of the American people. The OAS cannot be a veto to U.S. action—as I observed in a statement September 6 and again before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees September 17.

Once the commitment to an active policy is made, we cannot dodge the responsibility of using sufficient force to attain our purpose.

There is no easy way out. Once the power and prestige of the U.S. Government are committed to a struggle, whether it be in Cuba, Berlin, South Vietnam, or anywhere else, we cannot afford to have it ineffective. Those who argue for so-called policies of moderation at the start of the struggle are more apt supporting the very kind of halfhearted effort that led to the 1961 fiasco in Cuba, following which, it will be remembered, every Member of Congress, without regard to party, stood back of the President of the United States in the unfortunate situation which we then faced.

If the President decides that force is necessary to achieve his objectives and to protect the prestige and authority of our Nation, in my judgment he will have the wholehearted support not only of the Congress, but of the people of our country in the course that he feels it is necessary to pursue. But whatever action is taken, it must be strong enough and carefully planned so that it will not fail.

I am very happy that my colleague has brought up this subject. I intend to speak on it at greater length at a future time and to emphasize that there are many courses we can take short of the actual use of force, but with a stronger attitude and a more definite commitment toward what we are trying to

accomplish than has been indicated heretofore.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record the editorial published in the New York Times, to which I referred.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SHADOW OF 1957

Congressional election campaigns are occasions for candidates to air their views on national and international affairs; but, in their zeal to win, rival candidates are frequently unable to resist the temptation of overgeneralizing and oversimplifying the most critical issues. The one-dimensional approach is, unfortunately, effective with many voters.

If it is naive to expect candidates to refrain from injecting the Cuban issue into the current congressional campaign, it is still reasonable to suggest that they measure up to the responsibilities of the offices they are seeking.

A growing number of Members of Congress, including Jacob K. Javits, the senior Senator of New York, his colleague, Senator KEATINGS, B. KEATING, and Senator STROM THURMOND, Democrat, of South Carolina, are among those who are urging President Kennedy to take unilateral action against Cuba that could easily lead to war.

Senator KEATING has proposed an immediate economic and military blockade. He has indicated he would approve shooting, if required, to halt the flow of weapons and technicians from the Communist bloc. Senator Javits urged the President to tell the Soviet Government to cease the shipment of weapons and technicians. He said it would be "the President's duty as Commander in Chief to stop the shipments by whatever means he deems appropriate." If the Soviet Government did not accede to his request.

We do not like the present situation in Cuba, a Communist, Soviet-supported state on our very borders. Castro's political orientation is without question a potential danger to this hemisphere. But we are not at war with him. The proposals being put into circulation for public consideration by homesgrown advocates of "unilateralism" can only have the most damaging effect on our world position and the ability of the administration to deal safely with a hornet's nest.

The advocates of unilateral action against Cuba could profitably recall that it was the Suez affair in 1956 that diverted world attention to the point of enabling the Soviet Premier to crush the Hungarian rebellion without risking any physical reaction from the Western Powers. We must not fall into the trap of creating another Suez out of Cuba, to distract the world while Russia makes another Hungary out of Berlin.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills of the Senate, severally with amendments, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

S. 962. An act to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, to add the Civil Aeronautics Board in the investigation of aircraft accidents, and for other purposes;

S. 2558. An act to amend the act of September 7, 1950, to extend the regulatory authority of the Federal and State agencies concerned under the terms of the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, signed at Washington May 31, 1949, and for other purposes;

S. 3389. An act to promote the foreign commerce of the United States through the use of mobile trade fairs; and

S. 3504. An act to provide for alternate representation of secretarial officers on the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House had passed the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 214) authorizing the President of the United States to designate the period from November 26, 1962, through December 2, 1962, as National Cultural Center Week, with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 561) authorizing the Clerk of the House to make a correction in the enrollment of H.R. 8567, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 134. An act to provide that seat belts sold or shipped in interstate commerce for use in motor vehicles shall meet certain safety standards;

H.R. 915. An act to amend title 14, United States Code, to require authorization for certain appropriations;

H.R. 11587. An act to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in order to provide for the reimbursement of certain vessel construction expenses;

H.R. 5698. An act to extend the apportionment requirement in the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1983, to temporary summer employment, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11949. An act to repeal section 25 of title 13, United States Code, relating to the duties of supervisors, enumerators, and other employees of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce;

H.R. 11950. An act to amend section 131 of title 13, United States Code, so as to provide for taking of the economic census 1 year earlier, starting in 1963;

H.R. 11086. An act to amend title 28, United States Code, to provide for additional commissioners of the United States Court of Claims, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11111. An act to amend the act of October 4, 1961, authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to sell and convey certain lands in the State of Iowa; and

H.R. 12341. An act to amend section 309 of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills; and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

H.R. 6882. An act to provide for the exemption of fowling nets from duty, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 12190. An act to extend for a temporary period the existing provisions of law relating to the free importation of personal and household effects brought into the

United States under Government orders, and for other purposes.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON CALENDAR

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H.R. 134. An act to provide that seat belts sold or shipped in interstate commerce for use in motor vehicles shall meet certain safety standards;

H.R. 8151. An act to amend title 14, United States Code, to require authorization for certain appropriations; and

H.R. 11587. An act to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in order to provide for the reimbursement of certain vessel construction expenses; to the Committee on Commerce.

H.R. 5698. An act to extend the apportionment requirement in the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1983, to temporary summer employment, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11049. An act to repeal section 25 of title 13, United States Code, relating to the duties of supervisors, enumerators, and other employees of the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce; and

H.R. 11950. An act to amend section 131 of title 13, United States Code, so as to provide for taking of the economic census 1 year earlier starting in 1968; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 11111. An act to amend the act of October 4, 1961, authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to sell and convey certain lands in the State of Iowa; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

H.R. 11086. An act to amend title 28, United States Code, to provide for additional commissioners of the United States Court of Claims, and for other purposes; placed on the calendar.

THE 95TH BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY OF THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, today, as the Senate of the United States discusses the foreign-aid appropriations for 1963, we may well pause a moment to remember a former colleague.

Theodore Francis Green, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, did much through these eventful years to help our President shape the foreign policy of this Nation.

Today in health and happiness in the sanctuary of his Providence home, our former colleague, Theodore Francis Green, observes his 95th birthday.

For two-thirds of this century and one-third of the 19th century his life has been the essence of Americanism—of private virtue and public service.

Theodore Francis Green has always lived close physically and spiritually to his beloved Brown University and they have mutually honored each other for 80 years.

All his life Theodore Francis Green has lived close to the needs and yearnings of people—first, his neighbors—then, his State—then, his country and, as we have known him here, close to the necessities and yearnings of the entire world in a time of greatest stress.

We, his colleagues, on many occasions have been happy to speak in praise of our friend and fellow Senator, especially in that hour when he sacrificed personal